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Many countries seem to discourage international financial transactions by their residents, despite 
the benefits from portfolio diversification that such transactions provide. If a country is small 
relative to the size of world financial markets. such restrictive policies are probably counterpro- 
ductive. but a country that is large enough to influence world prices may find it advantageous to 
engage in such practices. In this paper, I describe a simple model of optimal taxation of risky 
foreign assets and examine the implications for risk sharing. 
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1. Introduction 
It has been widely observed that investors’ financial portfolios seem to be 
overly concentrated in domestic securities, despite the beneficial reduction in 
risks that are possible from international portfolio diversification. See for 
example, Feldstein and Hartman (1980), Obstfeld (1985), and Summers (1985). 
Indeed, government tax policy in most countries seems to actively discourage 
international diversification. 
The Japanese government, for example, has placed restrictions on banks’ 
net foreign exchange positions, regulated banks’ issue of Certificates of 
Deposit abroad, limited the amount of foreign assets held by international 
investors, regulated long-term Euro-yen loans, and so on. Investment trusts. 
insurance companies, and other institutions in Japan were not even allowed to 
hold foreign securities until the early seventies, and foreigners were not 
allowed to hold many types of Japanese financial instruments until the late 
seventies. ’ 
The Japanese case is extreme, but it is common to see special witholding 
taxes on dividends paid to foreigners, deductions rather than credits for 
foreign taxes paid, and other fiscal policies which tend to discourage interna- 
tional capital flows. Most countries have, at least at some time in their 
* This paper was prepared for the symposium on Financial Incestment in the U.S. nndfapan held 
at the New York University Graduate School of Business Administration, April 27 and 28. 
1987. I wish to thank Roger Gordon, Theodore Bergstrom, and Gary Saxonhouse for useful 
discussions about the topics considered in this paper. 
’ In 1983-1984 Japan agreed to a number of measures designed to liberalize these sorts of 
restrictions. See Frankel (1984) for a summary of the economic impact of these policies. 
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histories, engaged in large-scale intervention in financial markets in ways that 
appear to be designed to discourage trade in foreign assets. In some cases. 
such policies appear to be motivated by short-run fluctuations in exchange 
rate movements. But in other cases, it appears that governments may try to 
discourage trade in foreign assets as part of a long-run policy. 
When we consider the riskiness inherent in international financial markets. 
long-run attempts to discourage international portfolio diversification seem 
especially perverse. Grubel (1968). Levy and Sarnat (1970). Solnik (1974). 
Grauer and Hakansson (1987) and many other authors have pointed out that 
major stock indices in different countries often have rather low correlations 
with each other, and that this can be exploited in the construction of optimal 
portfolios. For a recent discussion see section 2 of the comprehensive survey 
by Adler and Dumas (1983). 
In the case of the U.S. and Japan. for example, the simple correlation of 
monthly price changes for the major stock market indices during the period 
1971-1979 was 0.33. In some cases, such as the U.S. and the U.K., the 
correlations were even negative. Such small correlations allow for substantial 
risk reduction via diversification. To the extent that other countries’ risks are 
not perfectly correlated with domestic risks, international investment offers 
highly beneficial diversification. Why would countries want to discourage such 
portfolio diversification? 
Gordon and Varian (1986) argue that such policy intervention may be an 
attempt to exploit market power in international financial markets. Even 
though any single security may be a small fraction of total world wealth, the 
total securities offered by a large country such as the United States or Japan 
may represent a sizable fraction of world wealth. To the extent that risks faced 
by different countries are independently distributed, each country’s securities 
offer a unique source of diversification. Thus, each country faces a downward 
sloping demand for its risky securities, and therefore may find it beneficial to 
attempt to exploit its market power. 
The tax policy in such a large country may be adjusted so as to exploit the 
downward sloping demand for its securities. By artificially restricting trade in 
its domestic securities, a country can raise the world price of those securities 
and thus increase the expected utility of its residents. Of course, if all countries 
attempt to exploit their market power, the resulting restriction in trade may 
make everyone worse off. Each country’s attempt to shift the terms of trade in 
financial assets in its favor results in an inefficient distribution of risk bearing. 
The optimal tariff results of international trade describe how countries can 
set tariffs and export controls so as to improve the terms of trade they face 
with respect to goods; we wish to apply the same notions to financial assets. 
The specific structure of demand functions for financial assets gives a special 
structure to the standard ‘large country’ results of international trade theory 
and allows for a more detailed analysis of the resulting equilibrium. 
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Gordon and Varian (1986) provide a detailed policy analysis of the optimal 
tariff in world financial markets. In this paper, I derive a formula for the 
optimal tariff in general circumstances and then apply this formula to the 
special case of financial markets. The particular case examined is a signifi- 
cantly simpler version of the Gordon-Varian model which allows for a 
relatively easy examination of the effects of tax policy on international 
risk-sharing. 
2. A general formula for the optimal tariff 
We begin by examining the optimal tariff for a single large country. This is, 
of course, a classic problem in international trade, and has been considered by 
a number of authors, among them Scitovsky (1942) and Graaf (1949). For a 
modern discussion, see Dixit and Norman (1980) and Woodland (1982). The 
closest treatment to our own is that of Bergstrom (1982), except that we use 
duality and focus on the representative consumer case. 
Most of the existing literature on optimal tariffs seems to implicitly treat 
the case of an export tariff. In this case it is natural to take the objective 
function of .the exporting country to be the maximization of tariff revenue. If. 
however, one examines the more economically natural case of a tariff on 
imports, maximization of tariff revenue is no longer an appropriate objective. 
In this case, the importing country must take into account not only the tariff 
revenue, but also the reduction in domestic welfare resulting from facing 
higher world prices. ’ In order to compute the optimal tariff, the marginal 
gains from the tariff revenue must be balanced against the marginal losses to 
domestic consumers and producers from the distorted prices. 
Consider a country which is a large consumer of a particular imported 
good. This country wants to choose a tariff on this imported good that makes 
its consumers as well off as possible, given the demand and supply of the good 
by the rest of the world. Denote the world price of the good by p and the tax 
on the good by t. If the country in question is large enough to have significant 
market power, the equilibrium price of the good will depend on the tax 
imposed on it, so we indicate this dependence by p(t). 
The indirect utility of a representative consumer in the country under 
consideration is denoted by u( p, ~1) where J’ is the consumer’s income. We 
assume that this country will return the tariff revenue to the representative 
consumer in a lump-sum manner. We denote this tariff revenue by 
r(t) = tx( p(t) + I). 
’ Even in the case of an export tariff, there will typically be a reduction in producer profits due to 
distorted prices. 
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where x( -) is the domestic consumer’s demand for the good. (In general, the 
demand for the good will depend on the consumer’s money income, which will 
in turn depend on the magnitude of the rebated tariff revenue. We ignore this 
general equilibrium income effect in what follows.) 
The optimal tariff problem then becomes 
max u( p(r) + 1, y + r(t)). 
The first-order condition for this problem is 
au ap+1 +aoE?L=,. 
G at [ 1 ay at 
Dividing this equation by au/Cly and applying Roy’s identity gives 
[ 1 ap+1 +L,. -x at at 
Differentiating the definition of revenue given in (1) yields 
-=$ ap+* +x ar 
at [ 1. ap at 
Substitute this into (2) and rearrange to find 
[ I ra”-x ap+tax_,_ ap at ap - 
It is useful to divide this expression by x and convert to elasticity form 
t lap t 1 I --c-l P x+7=O. 
Solving for l/p gives us 
(2) 
(3) 
Hence the optimal tariff on good i is inversely proportional to its elasticity of 
demand, weighted by the responsiveness of the world price to the tariff. If a 
country is only a small part of world trade in the good in question, dp/dt will 
be essentially zero, so that the optimal tariff in such a case is zero. But if a 
country is large enough so that its tax policy influences the world price of the 
good, then it will pay it to set a tariff to exploit this market power. 
In order to derive an expression for the bracketed term, we let X(p) be the 
demand for the good by the rest of the world and S(p) be the world supply. 
Demand equals supply then can be written as 
x( P(t) + r> + x( P(f)) = S(p(t)). 
Differentiating with respect to t and solving for ap/at gives us 
ap ax/+ 
at=- ao/ap - aslap 9 
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where D =x + X is total world demand. Multiplying the 
denominator of this expression by p/D, and recognizing 
equilibrium allows us to write 




that D = .S in 
(4) 
where E is the elasticity of country i’s demand for the good, s is the share of 
the country’s consumption of the good as a fraction of world consumption. cD 
is the elasticity of world demand and cs is the elasticity of world supply. 
Substituting eq. (4) into (3) and simplifying we have the final formula for 
the optimal tariff: 
t S 
-= 
P Sf + es-CD. 
(5) 
The optimal tariff as a fraction of the world price will depend on the country’s 
share of world demand. For a country that is a small fraction of world 
demand, the optimal tariff is near zero. But for a country with a significant 
share of world demand, the optimal tariff may be quite large. 
3. Financial assets 
We now apply the calculations of the last section to a simple model of 
world trade in financial assets. We will calculate the optimal tariff directly and 
also by applying formula (3). It will be seen that applying the optimal tariff 
formula will allow for a cleaner and more easily generalized analysis. 
We suppose that there are two countries, 1 and 2. Each country i is 
endowed with a technology that generates a random output in period 2 
denoted by <. For convenience, we assume that the certain rate of interest is 
zero and, for computational simplicity, that c are independent and normally 
distributed with mean q and variance CJ,~. 
We assume that there is an international market in these risky assets, and 
denote the before-tax price of asset i by p,. Country i may choose to tax its 
resident’s purchases of country j’s security with a specific tax of magnitude 
ti,. The revenues from this tax are returned to the residents as a lump sum. 
Let x,, denote country i’s holdings of country j’s security. Then the 
(random) wealth in country 1, say, will be given by 
I+,= Wo+T+p,x,,-(p*+f**)X,*+X,1~,+X,z~, 
where T = t,,x,* is the lump sum tax rebate. For future reference we note that 
the mean and variance of wealth are given by 
W =w,+T+(v,-~,)x,,+(~-~z-t,z)~,z, 
2-22 22 
uw - XllUl + Xl2~2. 
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The citizens of each country are assumed to have identical von 
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions with constant absolute risk 
aversion of a. It is well known that the assumption of constant risk aversion, 
in conjunction with normality, implies that individuals will maximize a linear 
function of mean and variance of wealth; that is, a mean-variance utility 
function of the form W- (a/Z)af+~. 
Hence the maximization problem facing individuals in country 1 before any 
taxes are imposed is 
max W,+ T+ (VI -pI)xII f (V,-p,)x,,-(a/2)(x:,u:+x:~~2). 
The first-order conditions for the optimal portfolio choice are 
V, -p, - ax,,u: = 0, 
V2 - p2 - ax,&? = 0. 










Note that the demand functions are independent of the prices of other goods 
and income, which were assumptions underlying the derivation of the optimal 
tariff formula derived above. 
Let us now solve for the world equilibrium in the absence of any distorting 
taxes. The demand equals supply condition for asset 1 is 
x11 +x1, = 1, 
ti,-=L v, -PI 
au: auf 
Solving, we have the equilibrium price of asset 1, 
Substituting back into the demand functions for asset 1 gives us the equi- 




The equilibrium in the absence of distorting taxes involves equal risk sharing: 
each country holds a fully diversified portfolio consisting of equal shares of 
each other country’s risky asset. 
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4. Equilibrium with distorting taxes 
Suppose now that country 1 puts a tax on its citizens’ purchases of foreign 
assets. This raises the price of country 2’s security to p2 + t,,. Let us solve for 
the effect of this tax on the equilibrium price and quantity demanded of 
security 2. 
Demand equals supply takes the form 
X,1 + .Yzz = 1, 
v,-Pz-‘12 + vz-Pz =1, 
aa,2 aa: 
Solving for p; and the equilibrium quantities demanded yields 
2 
pz* = v2 _ ao2 + ll2 ) 
2 
1 t12 *=__- 
x12 2 
2aa: ’ 
1 t12 *=-+_ 
x22 2 
2aa;. 
Suppose now that country 1 recognizes its influence on the market price of 
asset 2. It would generally make sense for it to set the tax on asset 2 so as to 
maximize the utility of its citizens, taking into account its influence on the 
market price of asset 2. 
This optimal tariff problem can be written as 
such that 
1 t12 
x12 = 7 - - 
2au: ’ 
2 
aa2 + t12 
P2= v2- 2 7 
T= t,,x,,. 
The first two constraints summarize the influence of country l’s tax policy on 
the price and quantity traded of country 2’s asset while the last constraint is 
simply the definition of tax revenues. Substituting the constraints into the 
objective function, dropping the inessential constants, and rearranging yields 
max 
(4 + f*2bJ,2 - 42) 
4auf 
_ [A$)( 0$-;12i’. 
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After some more manipulation and elimination of inessential constants. we 
reduce the problem to 
1 maxt,zaoz _-1l 2t,27 
which has the solution 
au: 
t* =- 
I2 3 . 
Note that the optimal tariff depends only on the variance of the foreign asset 
- terms involving the expected return have dropped out. This is because it is 
only the variance of the foreign asset that provides something unique - 
namely, the diversifiable risk. That is, it is the independent riskiness of the 
foreign asset that makes it less than a perfect substitute for domestic assets. 
and therefore leads to a less than perfectly elastic demand for it. 
Substituting back into the asset demand functions gives us the equilibrium 
trades: 
1 
x12 = 3 * 
2 
x22 = 3. 
Recall that in the no-tariff case, the efficient allocation of risk bearing was for 
each country to hold half of each country’s risk. Here, the attempt to exploit 
market power in each risky asset has lead to country 1 holding only a third of 
country 2’s risky asset. 
Of course, country 2 can do the same calculations. Since country 2 has a 
monopsony position in providing a buyer for country l’s risk, country 2 may 
be expected to discourage its residents from holding the risky asset of the 
other country. The net result is that each country only ends up holding a third 
of the other country’s risk. The ‘optimal’ tariff on country 2’s security has led 
to an inefficient allocation of risk bearing. 
5. A simpler calculation 
In the previous section we have calculated the optimal tariff directly. 
However, it is much easier to use the formula for the optimal tariff derived via 





aPz/%* 1 C 1+ ap&lt12 . 
Using eq. (6) we see that ap2/at12 = - l/2. The elasticity of demand can be 
derived from the expression for the demand function. We have 
P2 6x2 1 P2a4 P2 
<z---z -- = x2 6P2 aa,2 5 ’ -P2 - 112 Vz -P2 - ll2 
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Substituting into the formula for the optimal tax gives us 
[I? vz - P2 - t,2 -= 





The expression V2 - p2 can be interpreted as the risk premium - the difference 
between the expected value of the asset and its market price. Thus vve see that 
the optimal tax in this case is simply half of the risk premium. 
Using the equilibrium value of p2 from eq. (6). we have 
2 
112 = 
a02 + t12 
4 ’ 
which can be solved to give 
au,2 
t,2 = - 3 
3 
just as we derived in section 4. 
6. Extensions of the symmetric case 
The symmetric country case that we have examined up until now is a very 
special one. But armed with the general formula for the optimal tax. !ve are in 
a position to easily examine generalizations of the symmetric case to somewhat 
more realistic situations. 
6.1. Different degrees of risk aoersion 
First, we consider the case where the two countries have different degrees of 
risk aversion. Now the demand equals supply condition for world equilibrium 
takes the form 
V,-Pz-t,2 + Q--P2 1 ----= 
2 
alo2 a24 





3P2 a2 -=-_ 
at,2 u, +a,’ 
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Substituting this into the formula for the optimal tax. we find that 
f 12 = -+-(V* -P2). 
I 
Note that country l’s tax on country 2’s risky asset is proportional to country 
2’s degree of risk aversion - the more risk averse counrry 2 is, the more heavily 
counfry 1 wants to tax its risky asset. This fact did not emerge from the 
symmetric case. 
Intuitively, the more risk averse country is more anxious to shift its risk, 
and is therefore more susceptible to exploitation by the other country. That is, 
the more risk averse country will have a more inelastic net supply of its asset 
to the world markets and will be willing to accept worse terms of trade simply 
to shift some of its risk to world markets. 
6.2. Several countries 
case of is the of n In this we suppose 
country i country 2’s at a of t,, solve for l’s 
optimal rate. 
In case, demand supply takes form 
c 
- P2 - t,2 Q-P, +----==1 
rt2 aa; aa; 
which is easily solved for p2: 
P2= v2- 
.x + + 4 
n 
It follows that dp,/dt,2 = -l/n. and substituting this expression into the 





Thus, country 1 taxes only l/nth of the risk premium on country 2’s risky 
asset. Substituting the equilibrium value of p2, this expression reduces to 
t12 = 
Ili+2t,2 + aa; 
.2 . 
In the symmetric solution, all countries choose the same tax rate so that 
t,, = t,,, and we have 
2 
t12 = n2:;+l. 
Thus as the number of countries increases, the tax rate declines at a rate 
proportional to the square of the number of countries. This calculation 
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suggests that the gains from attemptin g to use taxes to exploit market power 
diminish rapidly as more countries adopt this policy. 
7. SuInm~ 
We have derived a general formula for an optimal tariff using duality 
theory and applied it to the optimal taxation of internationally traded finan- 
cial assets. The computations involved are much simpler than those involved 
in using the direct method. 
We have seen that the optimal tax in our framework will be a tax on the 
risk premium. The size of the tax will be directly proportional to the riskiness 
of the foreign assets and the degree of risk aversion of the exporting country. 
As the number of countries engaged in this tactic increases, the size of the 
optimal tax will decrease in proportion to the square of the number of 
countries. Thus the gains from exploitation rapidly diminish as the number of 
participants increases. 
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